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PATENT LAW-Computer Programs For Processing Data
With A Digital Computer Cannot Be Patented Under
Present United States Laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital computers must be supplied information in numerical form in
order to perform their operations and calculations. They ordinarily
operate using information which is represented by numbers in binary
numerical notation, whereas man ordinarily performs arithmetic cal-
culations using numerical information in the familiar decimal nota-
tion.' It is thus often necessary to translate information represented by
conventional decimal numbers used by man into binary numerical form
in order to allow a digital computer to utilize the information. This
translation or conversion is usually performed in two stages. First,
decimal numbers are converted into binary coded decimal (BCD) form,2
and then the resulting BCD numbers are converted into binary form.
In 1963, Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot filed an application in the
United States Patent Office seeking to obtain a patent on a particular
method for converting numerical information from one numerical base,
or form,3 (BCD) into another (binary) by the use of a programmed
1. The pure binary system of numerical notation uses only two symbols as digits
(indicated by "0" and "1") whereas decimal notation uses ten symbols ("0" through
"9"). In binary notation the symbols are placed in a numerical sequence with values
based on powers of 2, while in decimal notation, the numerical sequence of digits indi-
cates powers of 10. Any decimal digit from 0 to 10 can be represented in binary nota-
tion by a four digit number. Binary coded decimal numerical notation merely substi-
tutes a four digit binary number for each digit in a decimal number. Examples of
binary, decimal, and BCD notation are indicated in the following table.
Binary BCD Decimal
0000 0000 0
0001 0001 1
0010 0010 2
0011 0011 3
0101 0101 5
1001 1001 9
1010 0001 0000 10
110101 0101 0011 53
For a more detailed discussion of these numerical systems, consult D. EADm, INMO-
DUCTION To THE BASIC COMPUTER, 26-30 (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).
2. See note 1 supra.
3. Only Claims 8 and 13 of Benson's and Tabbot's patent application were liti-
gated on appeal. They read as follows:
8. The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into
binary which comprises the steps of:
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
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digital computer.4 In their patent application, they asserted that their
BCD-to-binary conversion method was simpler and more accurate than
methods previously used for making the BCD-to-binary translation.'
The Patent Office refused to issue a patent to Benson and Tabbot on
the ground that the subject matter of their invention, as defined in their
claims, was not within any of the statutory classes of patentable inven-
tions set forth in the United States patent laws.' The Patent Office
argued that Benson's and Tabbot's method for converting numbers, as
described in their claims, included within its scope mental processes
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is
a binary "1" in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary "1" in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary "1" to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a "1" to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation
for a succeeding binary "I" in the second position of said register.
13. A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal num-
ber representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of:
(1) testing each binary digit position i, beginning with the least signifi-
cant binary digit positions, of the most significant decimal digit representation
for a binary "0" or a binary "1";
(2) if a binary "0" is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least sig-
nificant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representa-
tion.
(3) if a binary "1" is detected, adding a binary "1" at the (i t l)th and
(i + 3)th least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant
decimal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant
decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser
significant decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution
of steps (1) through (3); and,
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant deci-
mal digit representation has been so processed.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972). The claims in a patent application le-
gally define the scope of the invention for which an applicant seeks patent protection.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) specified that a patent application "shall conclude with one
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention."
4. There are two basic types of computers: analog and digital. In analog com-
puters, data are represented as physical quantities instead of numbers, and an analog
device computer by measuring these quantities through physical analogy to the phe-
nomenon. Examples of simple analog computers are a thermometer, a slide ruler or a
mileage indicator on a car. Digital computers represent data in the form of discrete
numbers or digits, instead of physical quantities. Information is represented in the
various components of a computer in a form which requires only two distinct states
of a storage position: "on" or "off'. A digital computer contains circuitry permitting
it to perform certain basic steps, called "instructions". The computer performs
these operations in sequence according to a program designed by the person using the
computer. A complete program usually includes instructions for introducing, coding,
storing and output of data, as well as various arithmetical operations to be performed
on data by the computer, such as "add" or "shift". The circuitry and mechanical ap-
paratus used for storing one number in a computer is known as a register. A shift
register is a register within which a number may be reoriented by a circular permuta-
tation. D. Eadie, Introduction to the Basic Computer 4-8 (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).
5. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 683 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gotts-
chalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
6. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684-85.
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and mathematical steps which, the Patent Office maintained, were un-
patentable. On appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(hereinafter CCPA), the decision of the Patent Office was reversed.'
The sequence of steps described by the inventors' claims was found to
be within the useful, technological arts and, therefore, patentable as a
"process" under the patent laws.8 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari9 and reversed.10
Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous court with three justices
abstaining,'1 held that Benson's and Tabbot's invention was not patent-
able under the United States patent laws. Describing as settled the
principle that ideas, per se, are not patentable, the Court found that
granting Benson and Tabbot a patent on all the uses of their BCD-to-
binary conversion method in digital computers would, in effect, give
them a patent on the idea, or algorithm, embodied in their method,
since the only practical use for the algorithm would be in digital com-
puters. While confining the express basis for its decision to this rela-
tively narrow ground, the Court also stated that innovations in the tech-
nology of processing data in digital computers are not patentable under
the present patent statute. 2 The United States Constitution delegates
to Congress the power to grant inventors a limited monopoly on their
discoveries in order to promote the progress of the useful arts," i.e.,
the progress of technology.' Through the present patent laws, enacted
in 1952,15 Congress has exercised the power to authorize patent
monopolies. In sections 100(b) and 101 of Title 35, Congress has
defined the categories of discoveries and inventions for which patents
may presently be granted.'" While data processing methods could be
35 USC § 100(b) provides:
The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use
of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.
35 USC § 101 provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
7. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
8. Id. at 688.
9. 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
10. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
11. Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell abstained. 409 U.S. at 73 (1972).
12. 409 U.S. at 73.
13. "[Congress shall have power] . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing to. .. Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries,"
U.S. Const. art. I, section 8.
14. "The phrase 'technological arts' ... is synonymous with the phrase 'useful arts'
as it appears in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution." In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d
997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
16. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101, quoted in note 6, supra.
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made patentable, the Court stated, they are not protected by the present
patent laws, and further legislation would be required to afford them
patent protection if this were desired by Congress.' 7 The decision of
the Court implies that the scope of protection provided by the present
patent statute is significantly narrower than is permitted by the Consti-
tutional delegation of power to Congress.
II. PATENT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Commercial digital computer technology made a relatively sudden
appearance in the United States18 shortly after the present patent laws
were enacted in 1952. Since then, the digital computer industry has
experienced surprisingly rapid economic growth and unprecedented
technological innovation and development. 19 The novel technology of
the computer industry has raised difficult questions for the Patent Office
and the courts.20 The patentability of digital computing machinery
(herein broadly termed "hardware") 21 has never been questioned; 22
however, the possibile applicability of the patent laws to computer pro-
grams and techniques for solving particular problems with general
purpose computers (herein broadly termed "software") 2 ' has generated
extensive discussion and speculation.24 In the earlier stages of the
computer industry's economic and technological development, innova-
tions in mechanical, "hardware", aspects of the industry were of pre-
dominant importance. Later, as rapid developments continued, tech-
niques for using computers to solve problems, the "software" aspect of
computer technology, became increasingly important. 25  Eventually,
the amount of research and development devoted to software and the
rate of capital investment in software surpassed the rate of research and
17. 409 U.S. at 73 (1972).
18. The electronic digital computer was first used commercially in the mid 1950's.
Brief for Business Equipment Manufacturers Association as amicus curiae at 5, Gotts-
chalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
19. By 1972 over 165,000 computer systems made by American-based companies
are reported to be in use, with a cumulative value of $49.8 billion. Id. at 9.
20. See Woodcock, Mental Steps and Computer Programs, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
275 (1970), which contains a bibliography of 54 articles concerning the patentability
of computer programs as of May, 1970.
21. "Hardware is the mechanical, magnetic, electronic and electrical devices from
which a computer is fabricated." COMPUTERS AND THE LAW, 127 (R. Bigelow ed.
1966).
22. Patentable as a machine or manufacture. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
23. "Software" is a term used to describe sets of instructions given to computers
and is broadly synonymous with "computer programs". COMPUTERS AND THE LAW, 134
(R. Bigelow. ed. 1966).
24. See note 20, supra.
25. See, Bender, Business and Research Data on Software Development, 1968
THE LAW OF SOFTWARE PROCEEDINGS A-15, A-16 (Geo. Wash. Univ. 1968).
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investment in hardware.26 As the technical and financial importance of
software increased and actually began to exceed the importance of hard-
ware, the developers and vendors of software were understandably
eager to obtain some type of legal protection for their investments and
innovations.17  Hardware is manufactured by giant corporations such
as International Business Machines Corp. The software industry, in
contrast, is made up primarily of small specialized organizations."'
Legal protection for a proprietary interest in technology is generally
considered to be available through three different legal systems, the
patent laws, state trade secret laws, and the copyright laws.20 Protection
of computer programs under the patent laws has been favored by those
whose primary concern is development and sales of software, because
of the relatively broad and definite scope of the protection afforded."
On the other hand, patenting of computer programs has been strongly
opposed by the giant hardware manufacturers such as International
Business Machines Corp., who are anxious to preserve unrestricted the
use of computing machines purchased from them.3' Trade secret pro-
tection for software was felt by software developers to have several
drawbacks. First, since trade secret protection is only available under
state laws, there would be a variety of requirements in different states
and state law could not readily be employed to protect the technology
of the computer industry, which is national in character. 2  Second,
since the object of the trade secret laws is to maintain technology on a
confidential basis, the dissemination and industry-wide utilization of
advances in software technology would be severely hampered, and this
would tend to retard further development. 3 Further, recent Supreme
Court decisions have left the scope of protection afforded by trade
secret laws on a somewhat questionable level. 4 Printed computer pro-
26. Id. at A-35.
27. Id. at A-39.
28. Brief for the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Software
Products and Services Section as amicus curiae at 6, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972).
29. COMPUTERS AND THE LAw 90-93 (R. Bigelow ed. 1966).
30. A patent is a grant of the right to preclude others from making, using or selling
a claimed invention for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
31. See Brief for Business Equipment Manufacturers Association as amicus curiae
at 13, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
32. See Brenner, The Future of Computer Programs in the U.S. Patent Office, in
1968 THE LAW OF SOFTWEAR PROCEEDINGS B-1, B-4 (Geo. Wash. Univ. 1968); Cf.,
Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 909, 944-46
(1970).
33. See Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 241 (1968).
34. State trade secret laws may be partially pre-empted by federal legislation or
powers. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
564
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grams had been accorded copyright protection 5 by 1964, but the limited
proprietary protection offered by the copyright laws" was felt by soft-
ware developers to be insufficient to protect their interests. 7  Ac-
cordingly, they continued to seek the broader protection afforded by the
patent system.38
In 1966, the Patent Office published proposed guidelines for the ex-
amination of computer programs in its Official Gazette.3 9  The pro-
posed guidelines distinguished between two kinds of processes, one of
which was patentable, while the other was not. The type of process
which was not patentable was described as an "algorithm" process.4"
In contrast, a patentable process was termed a "utility" process in the
guidelines. 4'
To distinguish between algorithm and utility processes becomes
difficult in the case of a programmed general purpose computer
unless the distinction between a result of method or apparatus
operation and the function of the method steps or apparatus com-
ponent is maintained.
The result of a programmed operation of a computer may be
the mathematical transformation of data according to an algorithm
but the functioning of a computer is the change in state of certain
electrical or mechanical devices within the computer according to
35. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENT SML-47 (May 19, 1964).
36. Copyright protects only the form of expression of an idea in a published
work and not the idea itself. It will protect against outright copying, but not against
a subsequent original work utilizing the same idea. See, e.g., White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Appolo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
37. See Brief for the American Patent Law Association as amicus curiae at 24-25,
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
38. See, e.g., Koller and Moshman, Patent Protection for Computer Software:
Implications for the Industry, 12 IDEA 1109, 1112-13 (1968).
39. 829 OFF'L GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 865 (1966).
40. Special problems of patentability arise in the computer, data processing and
automatic control field that revolve around mathematical processes and
equations. These problems may be more generically stated as the broad field
of algorithms which are conclusions based upon a precise or mathematical
premise or line of reasoning.
For example the prediction as to the winner in a presidential election made
by a programmed 'general purpose' computer is based on an algorithm .. .
which has been evolved from a line of reasoning based on known factors and
is analogous to the mathematical formula. Similarly, business practices or
methods may be reduced to an alogrithm.
Mathematical process discoveries and mathematical formulas used therein
may not be patented although they may be of enormous importance
(e.g., e = mc 2 ) . . .
Mathematical formulas are not included within 35 U.S.C. § 101 since they
are not a process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or
useful improvements thereof.
Thus certain useful and important processes are non-statutory as being
merely expressions of an algorithm . . ." Id. at 865.
41. ". . . [O]ther useful processes are statutory since they deal with tangible
things and substances." Id. at 865.
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the algorithm, as distinguished from the individual or total com-
putational result of the components thereof.
Thus a process, defined as a series of steps for the manipula-
tion or evaluation of data, even though it is required to be carried
out by a programmed computer, would be an algorithm process.
A process defined as a series of steps for causing a sequence of
changes in state of components of the computer, even though the
sequence is dictated by an algorithm, would be a utility process. 42
The "mere inclusion of algorithm steps" in a patentable utility process
would not, according to the guidelines, render the utility process un-
pentable, "since the algorithm may illuminate or exemplify the utility
steps in the process."43
Mter a hearing on the proposed guidelines, 4 the Patent Office
adopted guidelines, in 1968, which stated specifically that computer
programming, per se, whether defined in the form of a process or
apparatus, was not patentable. 45  The legal theories set forth in the
adopted guidelines as support for the position of the Patent Office were
that processes which could be implemented by purely mental acts were
not covered within the scope of patentable subject matter as defined in
the patent statute, 46 and that a process or method was directed to patent-
able subject matter only if it was performed on physical materials and
produced some appreciable change in their character or condition.47
A computer programming process, unless combined with physically
implemented steps, was not covered by the patent statute.4
Another factor, which undoubtedly influenced the Patent Office in
making its administrative decision against issuing patents for computer
programs, was not mentioned in the guidelines. Evaluation of inven-
tions in the light of already known technology, in order to prevent the
42. Id. at 865-66.
43. "Where a process is a combination of algorithm and utility steps, its patent-
ability is measured by viewing the process as a whole against the background of the
prior art . . . to determine whether the process is characterized solely by the algorithm."
Id. at 866.
44. A hearing on the proposed guidelines was held on October 4, 1966. 855
OFF'L GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968).
45. "The basic principle set forth in the foregoing guidelines is that computer
programming, per se, whether defined in the form of process, or apparatus, shall not
be patentable." Id. at 830.
46. "Mental processes may not be patented although they may be of enormous
importance . . ." Id. at 829.
47. "A process or method is directed to patentable subject matter only if it is
performed on physical materials and produces some appreciable change in their
character or conditions . . . Id. at 829.
48. ". . . A computer programming process which produces no more than a
numerical, statistical or other informational result is not directed to patentable sub-
iect matter. Such a process may, however, form a part of a patentable invention if it
is combined in an inobvious manner with physical steps . . . as, for example, in the
knitting of a pattern or the shaping of metal." Id. at 830.
566
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patenting of information in the public domain, is a mandatory pre-
requisite to the issuance of a patent by the Patent Office under the patent
statute and case law.4" In 1966, the President's Commission on the
Patent System made a finding that the Patent Office lacked adequate
methods and facilities for classifying computer programs and for com-
paring them with already known technology.5" At the time the Patent
Office guidelines declaring programs to be unpatentable were adopted in
1968, the lack of methods and facilities had apparently not changed."
As of 1973, six years after study of the problem began, difficulties
persisted, and the Patent Office still considered its facilities to be in-
adequate for the task of examining computer program applications.52
Beginning in 1968, the CCPA decided a number of appeals from
Patent Office actions which involved digital computers. 53 In this series of
cases, Patent Office decisions denying patents for inventions involving
digital computers were almost uniformly reversed by the CCPA. The
decisions in these cases severely undermined the legal arguments asserted
by the Patent Office as the basis for its denial of patents for data process-
ing computer programs. 4 Since the issuance of a patent is mandatory
when the patent applicant complies with the patent statute, the Patent
Office was necessarily required to provide a legal basis for its refusal
to grant patents on computer programs. 55  The series of reversals by
49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 131 (1970). See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18-
19 (1966).
50. Uncertainty now exists as to whether the statute permits a valid patent to
be granted on programs. Direct attempts to patent programs have been
rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject matter ....
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of
the lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if
these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic be-
cause of the tremendous volume or prior art being generated. Without this
search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration
and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent. "To Promote
The Progress of Useful Arts," THE 1966 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM (reprinted in S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. p. 21 ).
51. Brenner, The Future of Computer Programs in the U.S. Patent Office, in 1968
THE LAW OF SOFTWEAR PROCEEDINGS, B-i, B-12 (Geo. Wash. Univ. 1968).
52. "At present there is no adequate system of classification, searching technique and
research files for computer programming. Consequently, it is highly doubtful whether
the criteria for examination of patent applications required by Graham v. John Deere
Co. . . . can be effectively applied to applications for patents on computer programs."
Brief for petitioner at 31, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
53. In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahoney, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417
F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968); modified on
rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
54. "One of the many sound ideas expressed in the concurring opinion delivered
by Judge Baldwin in Musgrave is 'that in reality very little remains as a result of our
recent decisions of the 'mental steps' doctrine.'" In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 687
(C.C.P.A. 1971). Cf. 855 OFF'L GAZEIIE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968).
55. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 131 (1970).
1973
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the CCPA effectively removed the legal basis for the Patent Office's
guidelines, and formed the primary basis 6 for the CCPA's holding in
In re Benson that data processing computer programs were patentable
processes under 35 USC §101." 7 The Patent Office, in its published
guidelines5 and in its administrative actions denying patents for com-
puter programming inventions,59 had relied on earlier cases decided by
the CCPA, In re Abrams,60 and In re Yuan,61 as authority for refusing to
grant patents on processes which could be performed by mental acts. 2
The CCPA, in In re Prater,63 interpreted the decisions in Abrams and
Yuan narrowly, as prohibiting a patent grant only in cases where no
mechanical apparatus whatsoever was described in the patent application
as a means for performing the process sought to be patented, thereby
leaving mental acts the only apparent way in which the process described
in such an application could be performed. 64  A process could be patent-
56. "The same line of cases is relied on here (by the Patent Office) that was re-
lied on in Prater and Musgrave and we have given them full consideration before, par-
ticularly in those two cases .... "In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
57. Id. at 688.
58. 855 OFF'L GAZETTE OF THE U. S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968).
59. See generally the discussions of Patent Office rejections in the C.C.P.A.'s opin-
ions in the cases cited in note 53, supra.
60. Abrams sought to patent a petroleum prospecting method which included steps
for "measuring", "determining", and "comparing". The C.C.P.A. found that the only
technological advance in the claimed method resided in these steps, which were said
to be purely mental. The C.C.P.A. affirmed the rejection of the claimed method by
the Patent Office. "Citation of authority in support of the principle that claims to
mental concepts which constitute the very substance of an alleged invention are not
patentable is unnecessary. It is self-evident that thought is not patentable." In re
Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
61. Yuan attempted to patent a method for determining the exact airfoil profile
most desirable for certain aerodynamic characteristics, which was to be used in de-
signing a high speed airfoil, according to certain mathematical relationships and proce-
dures. The C.C.P.A. affirmed the Patent Office's rejection, stating that "purely mental
steps do not form a process which falls within the scope of patentability as defined by
statute." In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
62. 'Purely mental steps' are considered to be steps which may only be per-
formed in, or with the aid of, the human mind. This is quite in contrast to
'purely physical steps' which may only be performed by physical means, ma-
chinery, or apparatus. Purely mental steps (e.g., 'believing') are quite differ-
ent from purely physical steps (e.g., 'heating') in many respects, not the least
of which is that the former are much less susceptible to specific definition or
delineation. Between the purely mental and purely physical ends of the spec-
trum there lies an infinite variety of steps that may be either machine-imple-
mented or performed in, or with the aid of, the human mind (e.g., 'comparing'
and 'determining'). In ascertaining whether a particular step is 'mental' or
'physical' each case must be decided on its own facts, considering all of the
surrounding circumstances, to determine which end of the spectrum that step
is nearer. It may well be that the step of 'comparing' may be 'mental' in one
process, yet 'physical' in another.
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 at 1402 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1969). See 855 OFF'L GAZErTE
OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968); In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
63. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
64. Abrams had disclosed no means whatever for performing, without human
intervention, two claimed steps of caculation and comparison . . . . Thus
Abrams disclosed and claimed a process which could only be performed in the
568
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able under the standards of 35 USC § 101, held the CCPA in Prater,5
even though it could be performed by mental acts, as long as mechanical
means for performing the process was disclosed in the patent application.
In addition, the CCPA required that mental implementation of the
process must be unreasonable in light of the description of the invention
and the scope of the claims in the patent application. 6 The Patent
Office had relied on the authority of In re Yuan67 and Cochrane v.
Deener8 to assert, in the guidelines, that a process, in order to be patent-
able, must be performed on physical materials and must produce some
appreciable change in their character or conditions.69 The CCPA dis-
cussed Cochrane v. Deener in its decision in Prater, and held that
Cochrane had been misconstrued in previous decisions, and did not
actually hold that processes must operate physically on substances in
order to be patentable. The actual intent of the opinion in Cochrane
had been, according to the CCPA, to extend the scope of the process
category of patentable inventions and to point out that a process is not
limited to any particular mechanical means used in performing it.70 In
re Prater thus rendered doubtful the adequacy of the legal arguments
employed by the Patent Office in its guidelines in order to maintain its
policy of refusal to grant patents for computer programs."
In a subsequent decision, In re Musgrave,7 2 the CCPA went further
toward eroding the legal basis for the Patent Office's policy. In an ad-
mind insofar as the teachings of the application were concerned.
'Yuan's disclosure was the use made of equations by pencil-and-paper
with the mind of the operator at work to interpret the results.' . [Als in
Abrams, insofar as the disclosure was concerned, the process (or the critical
step thereof) was one that required the use of the human mind-indeed, a
purely mental process or step.
Id. at 140.
65. "Disclosure of apparatus for performing the process without human intervention
may make out a prima facie case that the disclosed process is not mental and is, there-
fore, statutory." Id. at 1402 n.22.
66. As a result of Prater and Mahoney-if, indeed, it has not always been so-
there is a 'standard of reasonableness' in the interpretation of claims which is
that they should be given the meaning they would have 'to one of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art when read in light of and consistently with the specifi-
cation.' The question . . . is . . . would a reasonable interpretation of the
claims include coverage of the process implemented by the human mind?
In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
67. 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
68. "A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be trans-
formed and reduced to a different state or thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780,
788 (1876).
69. 829 OFF'L GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 865 (1966); 855 OFF'L GAZETrE OF
THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968). See also the Patent Office rejections discussed in the
cases cited in note 53, supra.
70. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
71. See note 69, supra.
72. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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ministrative action prior to the CCPA's Prater opinion, the Patent Office
had refused to issue a patent to Musgrave for a process using a digital
computer. The sole reason given by the Patent Office in denying
Musgrave a patent was that one or more steps in the process he claimed
could be performed by mental acts, so that the process did not fall into
one of the categories of patentable inventions set forth in 35 USC §
101.73 On appeal, the CCPA reversed, stating:
We cannot agree . . . that these claims (all of which can be
carried out by the disclosed apparatus) are directed to non-statutory
processes merely because some or all the steps therein can also be
carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because it may
be necessary for one performing these processes to think. All that
is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a
statutory "process" within 35 USC § 101 is that it be in the techno-
logical arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional pur-
pose to promote the progress of "useful arts." Constitution article
1 section 8.74
The Patent Office had refused to issue a patent to Musgrave solely on
the basis, discredited in the interim by the CCPA's decision in Prater,
that the subject matter of Musgrave's invention could be performed
mentally, although Musgrave in his application for a patent, had dis-
closed a machine with which to perform his process. 75  The decision of
the Patent Office in Musgrave could thus have been reversed by the
CCPA solely on the authority of its opinion in Prater,'7 without further
eroding the legal position of the Patent Office. The CCPA's reversal in
Musgrave, however, was based on a significantly broader rationale than
was stated in Prater.77  In Musgrave, the CCPA essentially held that
any sequence of steps qualifies as a "process" and is therefore patentable
subject matter under 35 USC § 101, if the sequence of steps serves to
promote the useful arts, and found that any sequence of steps which
could be performed by a machine, as opposed to a thinking human
being, was within the useful arts.7 ' The CCPA's decisions in Prater,
7 9
Musgrave,"0 and the other cases involving digital computers, relegated
to complete insignificance the idea that computer programs might be
unpatentable as algorithms or mathematical steps, except to the extent
that algorithms and mathematical formulae could be considered synony-
73. Id. at 885-86.
74. Id. at 893.
75. Id. at 893.
76. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
77. See In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Mcllroy, 442
F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
78. 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
79. 415 F.2d 1193 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
80. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
570
Vol. 4: 560
Case Comments
mous with so-called mental steps or acts. 81 The issues discussed at length
by the CCPA and the Patent Office in the series of digital computer
cases were related to the so-called mental steps doctrine.8 2 These cases
were concerned primarily with the difficulties inherent in attempting to
describe and claim data processing methods without also claiming mental
acts.83 Mental acts were considered to be outside the scope of patent
protection. 4 The thrust of the digital computer cases was to develop
a workable approach to the proper description and claiming of inventions
involving digital computers.8 ' The criterion established was that, when
a claimed process, reasonably interpreted, included only machine
(non-mental) acts, then the claimed process was covered by the "proc-
ess" category of patentable inventions.8 6 The critical feature, in the
CCPA's analysis, was claiming a method which could be performed by
a machine, as opposed to a method which could be performed using
the mental processes of a human being.8" The Patent Office effectively
withdrew its guidelines after its legal arguments had been undermined,
and began to examine computer program patent applications. 8
III. THE CCPA's DECISION IN Benson
When the claims for the programming invention of Benson and Tabbot
reached the CCPA on appeal from their final denial by the Patent
Office, only one ground for the denial of a patent had been properly
maintained. Thus, the issues discussed in previous cases as to the
proper scope of the inventor's claims were eliminated from review.89
The only issue remaining contested by the Patent Office was whether
the subject matter of the applicants' invention, as set forth in their claims,
was covered by one of the statutory categories of patentable inventions
listed in 35 USC § 101.90 Judge Rich, writing for the CCPA, pointed
out what may now be an important feature of Benson's and Tabbot's
process distinguishing it from the inventions claimed by the applicants
81. See generally cases cited in note 53, supra.
82. See 865 OFF'L GAZETrE OF THE U. S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968); In re Prater, 415
F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1968). For a detailed discussion of the mental steps doctrine, see
Sutton, The "Mental Steps" Doctrines: A Critical Analysis In The Light Of Prater And
Wei, 13 IDEA 458 (1969).
83. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
84. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
85. See generally Iandorio, Which Wei Did They Go, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 712
(1971).
86. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 687; In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 890-91; In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
87. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
88. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
89. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684-85; Iandorio, Which Wei Did They Go,
53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 712 (1971).
90. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684-85 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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in Prater and other previously decided cases involving digital com-
puters.9' In Benson's and Tabbot's patent application, they had stated
that their invention related "to the processing of data by program."
Accordingly, the CCPA expressly found that the invention was "directed
solely to the art of data processing itself, whereas in most of the above
cases 92 some subsidiary or additional art was involved." 93 The CCPA
had little trouble determining that Claim 8 of the application was
patentable, since it was limited to the use of physical computer apparatus,
a shift register.94 Under the decisions in Prater and Musgrave, this
limitation was clearly sufficient to bring the claimed process within
the useful arts, and to obviate the objection raised by the Patent
Office that Claim 8 covered mental acts.95 In its opinion in Benson,
the CCPA found that "a reasonable interpretation of the claims"
(emphasis the court's) would not include coverage of the claimed
process as implemented by the human mind, and broadly indicated
that data processing programs were patentable subject matter under
the patent laws, stating:
The solicitor would have us hold the method is not a "process"
within section 101 on the ground that a programmable computer
is merely a "tool of the mind" and the method is basically "mental"
in character, apparently because the "work stuff" of the method is
numbers which are mathematical abstractions. As the Patent
Office would say, we do not find the argument persuasive.96
The other claim on review in Benson, Claim 13, was asserted by the
CCPA to have "no practical use other than the more effective opera-
tion and utilization of a machine known as a digital computer" (em-
phasis the court's). 9r The characterization eliminated the problems
which had troubled the Patent Office and the CCPA in previous
cases 98 as to the possible inclusion of mental acts within the description
and claiming of an invention. The CCPA reasoned that digital com-
puters are obviously within the useful arts, and that a process having
91. In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (1970);
In re Mahoney, 421 F.2d 742 (1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (1969); In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (1969).
92. See cases cited in note 91, supra.
93. "In Bernhart it was 'Planar Illustration Method and Apparatus' by which two-
dimensional illustrations of three-dimensional objects could be produced; in Mahoney
we were concerned with data-processing itself in that the invention was a method of
locating the framing bits in a bit stream; in both Musgrave and Foster computers were
used to process seismograms; and in Prater the invention related to the spectographic
analysis of gases." In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
94. Claim 8 is quoted in note 4, supra.
95. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 686-87 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
96. Id. at 687.
97. Id. at 688.
98. See cases cited in note 91, supra.
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no practical value other than enhancing the internal operation of a digital
computer would also, of necessity, fall within the scope of the useful
arts and would therefore be patentable as a process under section 101.99
This assertion was made, apparently, on the authority of the CCPA's
holding in Musgrave that any sequence of steps which advances the
useful arts is a patentable process. 100 When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Benson, the only question for review, then, was whether
the method described and claimed by Benson and Tabbot was a "proc-
ess" within the meaning of the patent statute. T10
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In an opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court char-
acterized Benson's and Tabbot's computer programming method as
basically an algorithm for converting numbers from BCD notation into
binary notation. An algorithm, according to the Court, was a generic
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem. From the
generic algorithm for which Benson and Tabbot sought a patent, the
Court asserted, specific computer programs could be developed for
any desired application. What the Court found fatally absent from the
claimed process was just such an application of the algorithm which
characterized the invention to a particular new and useful end. The
algorithm, as claimed, lacked a sufficient relationship with tangible
physical results, which was necessary, in the Court's view, in order to
differentiate a patentable process from an unpatentable mathematical
formula or algorithm. In the absence of any particular substantial,
practical application to a useful end (which, the Court apparently
assumed, could not include information processing in a digital com-
puter), the claimed process was merely an abstract mathematical
formula.102
Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover
both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure-binary conver-
sion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to
verfication of drivers' licenses to researching the law books for
precedents and (2) may be performed through any existing machin-
ery or future-devised machinery or without any appartaus. 1°3
The Court also cited its decisions construing the meaning of the "process"
99. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
100. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
101. "The question is whether the method described and claimed is a 'process'
within the meaning of the Patent Act." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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category of inventions, 04 all of which were decided under previous
patent statutes' 0 5 which had been superseded by the enactment of the
1952 patent laws, 1° 6 but the Court did not appear to find a conclusive
answer in the cases to the question whether the "process" category was
sufficiently broad to include computer programs.0 7 Notably, the
Court expressly disclaimed any intention to prohibit, by its decision,
the patenting of computer programs in general. 0 8  In an apparent at-
tempt to make clear the narrow scope of the actual holding intended
by the Court, Justice Douglas tried to pinpoint the essential flaw in
the particular method claimed by Benson and Tabbot:
What we come to is the following.
.. .The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial
application except in connection with a digital computer which
means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.
It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these
programs, a policy matter to which we are not competent to
speak.109
The argument employed by the Court in this section of the opinion
may indicate the point at which it actually disagrees with the reasoning
employed by the CCPA in its opposite decision. The Court apparently
is in agreement with that portion of the CCPA's opinion in In re Benson
in which it held that methods "having no practical value other than
enhancing the internal operation" of digital computers are "in the
technological or useful arts.""'  For if the Court disagrees with this
assertion, its express declaration that the patent laws can be extended
to cover these methods would be meaningless, since Congress apparently
does not possess the power, under article 1 section 8 of the Constitution,
104. Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935);
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S.
1 (1887); Tilghram v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780 (1876); Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853).
105. The present patent law took effect on January 1, 1953. Public Law 593, 82d
Cong., 2d sess., ch. 950; 66 Stat. 792. The previous patent Statutes includes Act of
April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Act of July 4, 1836 ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
106. 35 USC § 1 et seq. (1970).
107. It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular ma-
chine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a 'dif-
ferent state or thing.'
We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
108. It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a
computer. We do not so hold.
Id. at 71.
109. Id. at 71.
110. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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to extend coverage of the patent laws to create monopolies on abstract
intellectual concepts and mental acts."' Rather, the Supreme Court
evidently intended, by its holding in Gottschalk, to declare merely that
a statutory "process", as defined in 35 USC §§ 100(b), 101,112 does
not have a sufficiently broad scope to cover every "sequence of opera-
tional steps which is in the technological arts so as to be in consonance
with the constitutional purpose to promote the progress of useful arts",
as asserted by the CCPA."' In other words, the Supreme Court seemed
to be implying in its opinion, that it is within the power of Congress to
extend patent protection to methods for processing numerical informa-
tion in programmed digital computers, but that Congress did not intend
to protect such methods under the present patent laws.
The basis for its decision, as explicated by the Court in Gottschalk
v. Benson, is obscured by several ambiguities' 1 4 which will inevitably
render difficult the future application of the decisional rationale. Never-
theless, two points are discernible which may affect future cases. First,
a method for solving a given type of mathematical problem is not patent-
able.' 5 Second, methods for using a digital computer to solve a given
type of mathematical problem are not presently patentable under the
United States patent laws.1 6  One troubling aspect of the Court's
opinion is its failure to differentiate between these two features of the
holding, and between the two corresponding, and distinctly different,
conceptions under which particular inventions may be unpatentable.
On one hand, scientific truths, natural phenomena, mental processes and
abstract intellectual concepts are apparently unpatentable in what might
be called a constitutional sense" 7 and thus cannot be defined as patent-
able by Congress, 1 8 since these abstracts concepts are basic tools used
by all persons in science and research,' 19 and their monopolization would
presumably not promote the useful arts. On the other hand, there are,
or may be, certain discoveries and inventions which are not proscribed
from patent protection under this broad constitutional limitation, yet
111. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 156 (1852).
112. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101 are quoted in note 6, supra.
113. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
114. See text accompanying note.
115. ". . . [I]f the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm
itself." 409 U.S. at 72.
116. "It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these pro-
grams . ." Id. at 72.
117. Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86 (1938).
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, section 8; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1969); Brenner v. Mansen, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
119. See note 111, supra.
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are still not patentable because they are not covered by one of the
specific categories of patentable inventions enumerated and defined by
Congress in the present patent statute. 12 0  Under the Court's analysis
in the opinion, the method claimed by Benson and Tabbot is unpatent-
able because a patent on their method would be "in practical effect"
a patent on an idea, and thus prohibited from patentability in the
constitutional sense. Yet the Court also suggests that "it may be
that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs . .121
Nowhere does the Court explain why a patent cannot be granted "in
practical effect" on an abstract idea under the present patent statute,
but that it would be somehow perfectly correct to grant a patent on the
same idea, "in practical effect", under some other patent statute. More-
over, the "in practical effect" reasoning employed here by the Court to
deny a patent to Benson and Tabbot would seem to contradict a principle
announced by the Court in the Telephone Cases.'22 In that group of
cases, Alexander Graham Bell successfully sought to enforce his patent
on a process for transmitting vocal and other sounds by varying the
electrical current in a circuit. 2 ' In upholding Bell's patent, Chief
Justice Waite stated:
It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for the trans-
mission of speech except in the way Bell has discovered, and that,
therefore, practically, his patent gives him its exclusive use for
that purpose, but that does not make his claim one for the use of
electricity distinct from the particular process with which it is con-
nected in his patent. It will, if true, show more clearly the great
importance of his discovery, but it will not invalidate his patent.12 4
In other words, the fact that Bell's patented process might, in practical
effect, give him an exclusive monopoly on the use of a natural phenom-
enon, electricity, for a particular purpose was deemed irrelevant by
the Court. What is true for a patented process employing a natural
phenomenon, electricity, would seem also to be true for a process such
as Benson's and Tabbot's which employs a mathematical formula or
algorithm.
The Court also faulted the programming invention claimed by Benson
and Tabbot because their process did not provide what the Court felt
was a new and useful result. On the authority of Cochrane v. Deener,'25
the Court's opinion stated that "transformation and reduction of an
120. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101, quoted in note 6, supra.
121. 409 U.S. at 72.
122. 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 535.
125. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
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article to a different state or thing is the cue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines."' 2 6 This state-
ment in the opinion is not easy to reconcile with the Court's holding
in the Telephone Cases, decided some twenty years after Cochrane, that
a process for varying the electrical current in a circuit may be patented. 127
Resolution of any apparent conflict may not be necessary, however.
Having thus unambiguously stated that a process must either trans-
form an article to a different state or must involve a particular machine,
the Court then went on in the opinion to muse that "It is argued that a
process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus
or must operate to change articles or materials to a different state or
thing"'28 (emphasis added). Speculation as to the import of these two
statements from the opinion, when taken together, is relatively fruit-
less, for the Court giveth and the Court then taketh away. Such word
play in the opinion gives rise, in effect, to a non-holding which lacks
firm meaning and has little value as precedent. Perhaps the Court
intended thereby to maintain a broad flexibility in its approach to the
question of patenting computer programs, the better to defer to any
expression of Congressional intent should Congress respond to the
Court's overt solicitations in the opinion.' 29
V. CONCLUSION
What effect will the Supreme Court's opinion in Goltschalk v.
Benson"30 have on the patentability of computer programs in general?
Presumably, a petition for certiorari was filed by the Patent Office in
Benson v. Gottschalk in order to settle a controversy which the Patent
Office considered to be of more than ordinary importance with respect
to the patenting of computer programs. It may also be concluded,
from the large number of amicus briefs filed with the Court"' by com-
puter manufacturers, program developers and legal organizations, that
there was a widely held presumption that the decision in this case would
largely settle the important question of the patentability of "software"
under the present patent laws. The practical importance of Gottschalk
in the future, if indeed it has any, clearly will be found in the extent to
which arguments employed by the Court in order to deny a patent to
126. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
127. 126 U.S. 1,534.
128. 409 U.S. at 71.
129. "If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which
only committees of Congress can manage.... "Id. at 73.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 63.
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Benson and Tabbot can be broadened to deny patents for digital com-
puter programs in general. The Court expressly stated that its holding
was not intended to bar patents on all computer programs. At the same
time, the Court implied that a class of programs is unpatentable."'
The unpatentable programs apparently are those which are not restricted
to use as part of an overall process having some useful end aside from
transformation of data in a computer. The Court seemed to fault
Benson's and Tabbot's process because it did not have what the Court
felt was a sufficient end use, and because the process would, if patented,
in practical effect, monopolize a mathematical formula. It may be
concluded that the Court intended to hold unpatentable, in general, any
method for using a digital computer to process data when the only
utility relied upon is the facilitation of the data processing itself. The
processes found patentable by the CCPA in cases decided prior to
Gottschalk v. Benson generally utilize the processing of data in a digital
computer as only a part of the process, while the processes themselves,
in these cases, were directed to end uses which the Supreme Court would
apparently find sufficiently concrete. 3 ' Thus, Gottschalk can be
sufficiently distinguished to allow the previously decided computer pro-
gramming cases to remain partially vital. The combination, in the
opinion in Gottschalk, of broad language as to the unpatentability of
"these programs", balanced with the Court's expressly narrow decisional
rationale, will leave the courts great leeway for flexible interpretation of
any future legislative action as to computer program protection.
WILLIAM D. REESE
132. Id. at 72.
133. See text accompanying note 103, supra.
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